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DO SPECIES AND NATURE HAVE RIGHTS?
James L. Huffman"
I. INTRODUCTION
Why all the fuss about Northern spotted owls and Snake River
sockeye salmon? Because the Endangered Species Act requires a fuss. The
Endangered Species Act requires that federal agencies "insure that any
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agenc[ies] ... is not likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of
[critical] habitat of such species ... ."I The issue is not whether to protect
endangered species. Congress decided that issue in 1973. The issue is how
to protect endangered and threatened species. Congress did subsequently
permit federal officials to ask whether to protect an endangered species by
convening the "God Squad,"3 but that option has been resorted to only
three times in 13 years.
Why did a Congress, which has difficulty making decisions about
anything controversial except its own pay raises, adopt, with near unanim-
ity,4 a statute which mandates the protection of species at any cost?
Congress surely did not believe that it knew the future costs of absolute
species protection, but it had to have known that those costs were
potentially very high. We can only conclude that Congress adopted the
Endangered Species Act on the belief that the protection of all species or of
any particular species is of infinite value.
But did Congress really believe that? No. Congress enacted the
Endangered Species Act, like much of its legislation, without really
understanding what it was doing. The idea sounded good. It appealed to
environmental, wildlife and conservation constituencies. Congress envi-
sioned the protection of bald eagles and grizzly bears, not desert pupfish
and Oregon silverspot butterflies. Most members of Congress were
shocked when they learned that the legislation they had adopted would
prevent the completion of the Tellico Dam because it endangered the snail
darter.5 The what? The only reason anyone in Congress gave serious
1. Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and Clark Law
School. B.S. 1967, Montana State University; M.A. 1969, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D.
1972, University of Chicago.
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1988).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) provides for the convening of an Endangered Species Committee with
the power to grant exemptions to the requirements of 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
4. The Senate passed the Act by voice vote and the House by a vote of 355 to 4. 29 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 673 (1973).
5. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 174 (1978).
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consideration to the snail darter was because the Tellico Dam, like many
federal water projects, was pure pork. But getting behind the Endangered
Species Act as an inadvertent limitation on pork barrel politics is hardly
adequate justification for so powerful an act, since every member of
Congress wants a side of ham for his constituents now and then.
The real power of the Endangered Species Act is not its inadvertent
limit on federal projects with a fractional benefit/cost ratio. Its real power,
as environmental activists have discovered, is as a limit on growth. Ever
since the Club of Rome's apocalyptic announcement of the "limits to
growth,"' orthodox environmentalists have been searching for the legal
mechanisms to constrain the earth plundering, anthropocentric capitalists.
Anthropocentrism is the problem, they say,7 and it is difficult to get the
anthropoids in Congress to look at things from the points of view of spotted
owls and red cockaded woodpeckers. Whatever Congress was thinking in
the enactment of the Endangered Species Act, they inadvertently pro-
duced as nonanthropocentric a statute as is possible. The good lawyers who
represent environmentalists know a powerful weapon when they see it.
Endangered Species Act litigation is springing up in every corner of
the United States. Most of this litigation is motivated not by a desire to
protect a particular species, but rather to protect an entire natural area
which constitutes endangered species habitat. It is old growth forests, not
spotted owls, which are at issue in the Pacific Northwest. Advocates for
these forests are dependent upon the owl being endangered. The endan-
gered species is merely a vehicle for much grander objectives, the
achievement of which depends upon a species being on the brink of
extinction. If the spotted owl either recovers or is extinguished, the ESA
will no longer provide protection for old growth forests. The Endangered
Species Act thus creates a perverse incentive for species endangerment
which distorts both scientific inquiry and political debate.
The Endangered Species Act is unusual in an important respect.
Unlike most environmental legislation, Congress firmly stated its position
in this Act. Congress has mandated that if a species is endangered, if its
survival is at significant risk, actions which contribute to that risk will not
be undertaken. The Act does not say that federal agencies must consider
the impacts of their actions on species survival. It does not merely
acknowledge, as NEPA does with respect to the environment in general,8
6. D.H. MEADOWS ET AL., THE LIMITS TO GROWTH (1972).
7. "Except for us, the life of the planet conducts itself as though it were an immense, coherent
body of connected life, an intricate system, an organism. Our deepest folly is the notion that we are in
charge of the place, that we own it and can somehow run it. We are a living part of Earth's life, owned
and operated by the Earth, probably specialized for functions on its behalf that we have not yet
glimpsed." THOMAS, HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY, PHENOMENON OF CHANGE 1 (1986).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4431-4370 (1988). See Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen,
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that species protection is something to be weighed in the utilitarian
balance. The Act says that action cannot be taken if it endangers the
survival of a species.
What is the philosophy of species protection? What is the philosophy
of biodiversity protection? How do those philosophies relate to the
traditions of western liberalism? These are questions our legislators must
address as they consider proposals to amend the Endangered Species Act9
and to enact protections for biodiversity.10 Part II of this essay discusses
Congressional intent in adopting the Endangered Species Act. Part III
examines rights and nonrights based theoretical justifications for species
and nature protection, classifying rights based theories as biocentric and
anthropocentric. Part IV concludes that neither rights claims nor moral
claims will alter the essentially political nature of most human actions
affecting species and nature. Human values will ultimately govern human
impacts on the natural environment.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
One answer to the query about the rationale of species protection
under the Endangered Species Act is that, as with much legislation, there
was no theory. This might be understood to mean that Congress really had
no idea what they were enacting. It is surely inevitable that Congress does
enact laws without anticipating all or even the most significant of their
consequences. In the case of the Endangered Species Act, Charles Mann
and Mark Plummer have argued that neither President Nixon nor
Congress "had a clue about what they were setting in motion."' , They
thought they were enacting a law to protect the noble creatures; like bald
eagles and grizzly bears, which have come to symbolize the power of both
nations and nature. The result was a law which protects snail darters,
pupfish and, as the Act's detractors would no doubt remind us, slime mold.
The preceding view is not really that Congress had no theory, but
rather that Congress' theory was inevitably simplistic. The complexity of
the modern world, both natural and human (to borrow the puzzling
distinction often drawn by deep ecologists), is such that Congress can never
anticipate the unintended consequences of its actions. 2 Alternatively it
might be argued that there is never really a Congressional theory for any
444 U.S. 223 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Endangered Species Protection Act of 1991, 1991 H.R. 61; Forests and Families
Protection Act of 1991, 1991 H.R. 2463; Endangered Species Act of 1973 Amendment, 1991 H.R.
3092; Northwest Forest Protection & Community Stability Act of 1991, 1991 H.R. 3263.
10. See, e.g., Forest Biodiversity & Clearcutting Prohibition Act of 1991, 1991 H.R. 1969;
National Biological Diversity Conservation Act, 1991 H.R. 2082.
11. Charles Mann & Mark Plummer, TheButterflyProblem, 269 THE ATLANTIc 47,49 (1992).
12. GARRETT HARDIN, FILTEis AGAINST FOLLY 53-59 (1985).
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piece of legislation, but rather a complex of theories propounded by
different interests and individual members of Congress. These different
theories are stirred in the Congressional pot to form a legislative stew
which can never be deconstructed (to borrow another bit of nonsense which
seems to prop up deep ecology). 13 Justice Scalia, who is no deep ecologist,
might put the same point differently in his campaign to do away with
reliance on legislative history as a source for interpretation of statutes.'4
Whatever the purposes, or lack thereof, of Congress in enacting the
Endangered Species Act, it is not a statute with the open texture which
makes interpretation difficult. Its language is clear on the central principle
that species are to be protected at any cost, subject to the possibility of an
overriding judgment by the "God Squad". Such a statute demands a
theory, whether or not Congress, or individual members of Congress had a
theory when the Act was adopted. It demands a theory even though few
projects actually have been shut down because of the endangerment of a
species. 5 Most controversies have been resolved under the consultation
process.' 6 Indeed the fact that most controversies under the Act have been
resolved through consultation should help to inform the theory which is at
work in the implementation of the Act.
III. THEORETICAL ALTERNATIVES
The theoretical alternatives are several, which might be conveniently
divided into two categories for purposes of discussion. One set of theories
13. Although the concept of deconstruction of ideas has legitimate philosophical roots, see M.
FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980), it has become a substitute for reasoned analysis in much
critical theory, including deep ecology. It might be better termed destruction rather than deconstruc-
tion. The recurrent theme is that existing ideas are the product of extant and historic allocations of
power which must be overthrown in favor of truth. See, e.g., C. SPRETNAK, THE SPIRITUAL DIMENSION
OF GREEN POLITIcs 33 (1986). "Once reverence for the mysteries of the life force was removed from
Nature and placed in a remote judgmental sky god - first Zeus, then Yahweh - it was only a matter of
time before the "Great Chain of Being" would place the sky god at the top of "natural order" and
Nature at the bottom (trailing just behind white women, white children, people of color and animals)."
Id.
14. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 11l S.Ct. 2476 (1991).
15. It is impossible to know how many projects have been abandoned because of the prospect of
expensive modifications or absolute prohibition. Few investors are willing to go to the mat over
principle. Indeed most of the controversies which have been pursued beyond the consultation stage have
involved public rather than private projects, underscoring the reality that private investors are far more
likely to cut their losses than are public agencies.
One example, which has been described in detail by Charles Mann and Mark Plummer, is a
conflict between the Oregon silverspot butterfly and a proposed golf course at Gearhart, Oregon. This
case is surely only one of many such projects abandoned in the face of high compliance costs, or even an
absolute prohibition. It is also an example of a failure of the consultation process. Mann and Plummer
demonstrate that the endangered silverspot could have benefitted from, rather than been threatened
by, the project. Mann & Plummer, supra note 11.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a), (b) (1988).
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for something like the Endangered Species Act is based upon rights
analysis. These rights based theories can be again divided into biocentric
and anthropocentric categories. Another set of theories is dependent upon
non rights based analysis. Rights based theories might lead to the following
propositions:
Biocentric rights theories:
1. Individual creatures or organisms have a right to exist.
2. Species have a right to exist.
3. Ecosystems have a right to exist.
4. Nature has a right to exist.
Anthropocentric rights theories:
1. Individual persons have a right to the existence of
individual creatures and organisms, species, ecosys-
tems, or nature.
2. Society has a right to the existence of individual
creatures and organisms, species, ecosystems, or
nature.
Non-rights based theories for legislation which mandates the survival
of nature might lead to the following propositions:
1. Humans have a secular moral obligation to preserve
nature.
2. Humans have a religious obligation topreserve nature.
3. Nature should be preserved because it is natural.
4. It should be presumed that society will be better off in
the long run if nature is preserved in its maximum
diversity.
IV. RIGHTS BASED THEORIES FOR PRESERVING NATURE
Rights based theories are appealing for several reasons. First, not-
withstanding that some modern jurisprudential theory object to the
concept of rights,"7 rights talk is common to most discourse in western
political theory. Whether one propounds a natural law theory or a positivist
theory, 8 the concept of rights is meaningful and important. Second, rights"
17. Modern feminist legal theory has drawn on Carol Gilligan's distinction between the male
value of individual autonomy and the female value of caring to disparage the role which rights have
played in American law. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 25-51 (1982). For example, Ann
Scales objects to the liberal idea of rights as presenting "a pretty grim view of life on the planet," Ann
Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1391 (1986).
18. Rights analysis is important to legal positivists, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
(1961); J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979), and to natural law theorists, L. FULLER, THE
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theory has played a central role in the justification of both revolutionary
and gradual political change over the last two centuries. From the
American Revolution of 1776 to the eastern European revolutions of the
1990s, rights claims have been important to the vindication of new
allocations of political power. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly,
rights claims are very powerful in western political theory. The central
characteristic of rights, as Ronald Dworkin has pointed out is that they
function as trumps. 19 The holder of a right has a special claim which can
override otherwise legitimate private and political decisions. Depending
upon the interpretation and enforcement of these rights, they can be
extremely powerful.
Notwithstanding significant recent immigration from non-Western
societies, United States law and politics remain largely a product of
Western legal and political philosophy.2° We think in terms of individuals,
their relation to one another, and their relation to the state. Although there
is a strong tradition of community, it is the community composed of
individuals. Ours is a political theory of rights and duties2 1-rights which
the individual may claim against other individuals and the state, and duties
which the individual owes to other individuals and the state.22
Organized political societies are the product of social contract, or so
much of our political theory holds. 3 Social contract is common to western
political theory precisely because it accommodates the central value of the
individual. In social contract theory, the individual is properly subject to
the authority of the state because the individual has consented. Social
contract theory overcomes the difficulty of justifying central authority in
an individualistic philosophy by beginning from unanimous consent and
then justifying socially imposed limits on the basis that such limits have
been agreed to in the original contract. Because actual consent is seldom if
ever the case, various explanations, ranging from implied consent to
estoppel, have been used to justify the central political authority in terms of
MORALITY OF LAW (1964); J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). It is also central
to R. Dworkin's theory which purports to walk a middle ground between natural law and positivist
theory. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
19. "It follows from the definition of a right that it cannot be outweighed by all social goals. We
might, for simplicity, stipulate not to call any political aim a right unless it has a certain threshold
weight against collective goals in general .... " R. DWORKIN, supra note 18, at 92.
20. On the western legal tradition, see H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1983).
21. See W.N. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS As APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING (1923).
22. A new journal, The Responsive Community, published by the Center for Policy Research, is
devoted to the examination of these issues of rights and responsibilities.
23. See, e.g., T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); J. LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT
(1690); and J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762).
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individual choice.
From the inception of social contract theory, not all members of
society were included in the contract. For the most part the relevant
individuals were white males, often with a freehold or some other basis for
having a stake in the community. The exclusion of some groups of
individuals from the contract was usually justified in terms of natural
capacities. Blacks were naturally inferior to whites, women had a special
role to play in the rearing of children, and retarded adults and children
were of insufficient mental and judgmental capacity. These exclusions
from the social contract were gradually challenged, and today blacks and
women have standing comparable to white males. Children and the
mentally disabled retain something of their inferior status, although in
many ways the law has shifted in the direction of rights for these groups as
well.
Throughout our efforts to explain and adjust the exclusion of some
individuals from full participation in the social contract we have looked to
animals for comparison. Numerous factors have been relied upon to
distinguish animals from humans, and by analogy some humans from
others. Ability to feel pain, ability to reason, ability to use tools, ability to
care for others. Originally all animals were considered the same, but
expanding knowledge of animal capacities has led to the drawing of
distinctions among animals. Those which appear to have high levels of
intelligence are thought to be deserving of greater respect and protection.
They are thought to have something resembling rights which entitle them
to certain protections from the central authorities of the human society.
These rights may have only a moral dimension, imposing moral but not
legal duties on persons who interact with the animals. However, they may
also be thought to have legally enforceable rights.24
In some respects the Endangered Species Act is a creation or
recognition of such rights. The Act purports to recognize a species right to
survival, but not a right of survival in the individual members of the species.
This species right concept has interesting parallels to the group rights focus
of some modern constitutional law. It is rooted in the notion that there is a
commonality of interest among the members of a particular group or
species. Although the group rights concept has had important conse-
quences in American constitutional law,2 5 its proponents have encountered
24. For a well known proposal for the practical recognition of non-human rights, see C. STONE,
SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING (1974).
25. The notion of group rights has been most influential in the justification of affirmative action
programs in the face of equal protection challenges. In constitutional jurisprudence the concept is
rooted in Justice Stone's idea of "discrete and insular minorities." United States v. Carolene Products,
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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difficulties in integrating the idea with the individual rights traditions of
western political theory.26
It is not clear, however, that Congress was committed to a species
rights theory in adopting the Endangered Species Act. Indeed, as
indicated previously, it is not clear what theoretical justifications were
perceived, so it will be fruitful to examine several alternatives within the
general concept of rights.
A. Biocentric Rights Theories:
1. Individual creatures or organisms have a right to exist.
Few will advocate that individual creatures or organisms have a right
to exist, although we do have some laws which seem to recognize certain
rights in individual animals. For example, anti-cruelty laws prohibit
specific treatment of individual animals,' 7 and there are even occasional
laws prohibiting damage to individual plants.2" But no person who lives
long enough to express the view can reasonably contend that all living
organisms have a right to exist. Human nutritional requirements necessi-
tate the consumption of once living things. Some vegetarians make a
principled distinction between plants and animals, while others distinguish
been mammals on the one hand and other animals and plants on the other.
Only those humans prepared to starve to death can assert that every
organism has a right to exist. Any such persons will also, during their brief
lives, have to devote considerable energies to preventing one organism from
taking the life of another, unless they are prepared to explain why the right
to exist operates only against human actions.
Since not all living organisms can have a right to exist, the central
problem for those who would claim such a right for some animals or
organisms is distinguishing between those organisms which have such
rights and those which do not. The biological sciences have developed
taxonomies which identify some organisms as "higher" than others, but
these are based upon considerations which do not always conform to
human perceptions about the importance of certain plants and animals.
For example, the gigantic old growth trees and the salmon of the Pacific
Northwest are considered important by many people, yet both are
26. The standard affirmative action case involves an equal protection challenge by a nonbenefi-
ciary of a discriminatory law, the purpose of which is to favor members of groups which have suffered
from historic discrimination. The claim is that the nonbeneficiary's right to equal protection is violated
by a law which denies and grants benefits on the basis of membership in a group. Under the group rights
theory, the individual's rights claim must give way.
27. See, e.g., Oregon Revised Statutes § 133.377 (1989) providing procedures for the arrest of
persons for cruelty to animals.
28. See, e.g., Colorado Revised Statutes 24-80-906 (1990).
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relatively low on the biologist's hierarchy. It is not the biological character-
istics of the fish and the ancient trees which make them of concern to
people, but rather their importance to a traditional way of life, perhaps
their size, and most significantly their scarcity.
We do not consider human beings important for the same reasons.
Every individual person is valued for his or her autonomous and collabora-
tive capacities. The abilities to act independently and cooperatively, to
reason and make choices, are what make rights meaningful. To speak of
individual salmon and trees as having rights is to anthropomorphize these
organisms which have in common with humans only their most basic
biological characteristics.
If individual animals are to have rights it must be because they have
capacities which make rights meaningful. It may well be that some animals
have those attributes which have justified the inclusion and exclusion of
categories of humans from traditional systems of rights. We have made
many mistakes in our application of these standards to humans, and
perhaps we will someday have the capacity to know whether we have made
similar mistakes with respect to nonhuman animals or other organisms.
But unless we develop the capacity to communicate with these other forms
of life, we will not be able to accommodate nonhuman rights holders in our
system of rights because they will not have the essential capacity to appeal
for enforcement of violated rights. Christopher Stone once argued for a
trusteeship system which would allow humans to assert the rights of
natural objects,29 but the concept ultimately fails because we humans
cannot know what serves the interests of natural objects,30 even assuming
that they have interests in any meaningful sense. If we could somehow
persuade ourselves that it is not silly to ask whether a 600 year old Douglas
fir tree would prefer to provide the supports for a revered structure like
Timberline Lodge on Oregon's Mount Hood or to crash to the ground in a
windstorm and slowly decay into nothingness, we can nevei know the
answer. To preserve or fell an ancient tree in the name of the tree's rights is
to engage in a fiction which can only serve the interests of those with the
power to act on what they claim to be the tree's interests. We are once and
always humans. To recognize rights in natural living organisms is to
recognize rights in those who care about those organisms.
2. Species have a right to exist.
The concept of species rights, which is the most plausible explanation
29. Stone, supra note 24. For a reconsidered opinion on the same subject, see C. Stone, Should
Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
30. James L. Huffman, Trees as a Minority, 5 ENVTL. L. 199 (1974).
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of the Endangered Species Act, suffers from the same theoretical short-
comings as the idea of individual organism rights. It also presents some
problems of its own. The notion that individual organisms have interests
which would make meaningful the concept of rights tests credulity. That
species, or other aggregations of organisms, have such interests is even
more fanciful. Both ideas might appear to gain support from the theory of
the "selfish gene,"'3 1 but it would be a mistake to equate the choices made
by individual humans with the natural selections of evolutionary biology.
To explain evolutionary history is not to conclude that it was purposefully
directed by organisms or species. In any event, the fate of species rights
claims, like those of individual organisms, will be left to human claimants
and judges in any foreseeable system of rights definition and enforcement.
Even discounting the realities of our inevitably anthropocentric legal
and political systems, we should ask why would (under a natural rights
theory) or should (under a positive rights theory) species have rights? Why
not genuses, or families, or orders, or classes, or phylum or the animal and
plant kingdoms as a whole? Or why not sub-species, which better describes
the Northern spotted owl and the Snake River sockeye salmon? Why are
species particularly deserving of rights? If survival of particular genetic
stocks is important to organismic group rights, than those rights cannot be
assigned above the species level on the taxonomic system since the ability to
breed one with another is obviously essential. But if this is what natural
object rights is about, we cannot settle for species rights. Rather we must
look to subspecies and local variations on subspecies and ultimately to the
individual organism if unique arrangements of genes are what we are
protecting. Species are nothing, after all, but aggregations of individual
organisms according to taxonomies contrived by the minds of humans.
In the foothills and mountains of the South Island of New Zealand a
small to medium sized butterfly drifts lazily above the native tussock. Until
1978 it was considered "a single variable species,"' 2 but it is now
understood to occur as "three similar species" 3 within the genus
Argyrophenga. The casual observer will not distinguish among the three
species. The careful observer will note differences, but so too, the careful
observer will note differences within each of these species. Although the
habitat of A. janitae, A. harrisi, and A. antipodum has been reduced by
agriculture,34 the butterflies are abundant and the collector will want not
31. See, e.g., R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976); E.O. Wilson, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW
SYNTHESIS (1975).
32. G. GIBBS, NEW ZEALAND BUTTERFLIES: IDENTIFICATION AND NATURAL HISTORY 82
(1980).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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just examples of each, but examples of the variation within each species. If
butterflies are to have rights, is it sufficient that the genus Argyrophenga be
preserved, or must we protect each of the three species? And what if
entomological taxonomy someday concludes that there is really a fourth
spebies of Argyrophenga? Or why not just protect the family Nymphalidae
to which Argyrophenga belongs? Does it matter that New Zealand has
only twenty-three species of butterflies (of which a mere eleven are
endemic), compared to 364 species in neighboring Australia? 35 Surely not
to the butterflies entomologists have chosen to call Argyrophenga.
And what if I am wrong? What if the members of the genus
Argyrophenga or the species A. janitae care passionately about survival of
their taxonomic group? How will we know? Are we simply to assume that
these orange and brown butterflies wish to go on for eternity flitting about
the tussock grasses of the South Island? Perhaps they are a particularly
altruistic species which would prefer to sacrifice their habitat to more
grazing land for sheep. And why should we conclude that as a species they
have interests which can be pursued through rights? Perhaps they are a
species of selfish individuals unable to agree on a common purpose. Perhaps
a particularly charismatic A. janitae will claim to represent the interests of
the species. Yet it matters not what the butterflies want, in the unlikely
event that they want anything, because whatever rights they may be said to
have will be the vehicle for the pursuit of human objectives.
3. Ecosystems have a right to exist.
To have an effect on proposed development, the Endangered Species
Act is dependent upon there being an endangered or threatened species. 86
If a listed species recovers sufficiently to be delisted, the ESA is no longer a
useful tool for opponents of development. Many environmentalists, per-
haps due to the discomfort of having to argue for salvation and extinction in
the same breath, are coming to view the Endangered Species Act as
inadequate.3 7 The task, they say, is not species protection but the
preservation of biodiversity.38 Biodiversity is the rallying call of 1990s
35. Id. at 17.
36. The Act is also dependent upon the identification and listing of endangered and threatened
species. There is much that we do not know about the survival prospects of species, not to mention the
species that have yet to be identified. There is also a long delay in listing of species which are believed to
be threatened or endangered.
37. See, e.g., Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species Act Doesn't
Work-And What to Do About It, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 273 (1991).
38. Although his title promises six reasons why the Endangered Species Act does not work,
Rohlf goes on to list "Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species Act Is Not an Effective Tool
for Conserving Biodiversity." Id. at 275. It is presumed that if the ESA is working, it is protecting
biodiversity.
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environmentalism. One imagines the Biodiversity Protection Act, the
effects of which will make the economic and social dislocations of the
Endangered Species Act pale in comparison.3 9 And that is precisely what
many biodiversity advocates would prefer. Although there is an anthropo-
centric case for biodiversity, 4° some of its advocates see it as an end to be
achieved at any cost. In the latter view, human societies are often seen as a
plague on the earth. We should not mourn, it is argued, the demise of
economic and social institutions that have destroyed many of the earth's
inhabitants and much of its ecology.
In terms of rights, biodiversity translates into the concept of ecosys-
tem rights. Ecosystems are viewed as entities distinct from and greater
than the organisms which inhabit them. In material terms they certainly
are larger than the sum of their organic parts. Inorganic materials are
essential to ecosystems, as are climatic conditions. It has been suggested
that each of these inorganic phenomena, like mountains and rivers, have
rights,4 but a more powerful concept is that the ecosystem itself has rights.
The rights of each constituent element of an ecosystem are dependent upon
the survival of the ecosystem. The mountain will not be the same without
the minor erosive effects of the mountain goat, and the mountain goat may
not survive without the mountain. Symbiosis is the name of the game and
the ecosystem determines the players.
The dependence of individual organisms on their ecosystems has a
parallel in human societies which may serve the ecosystem rights theory.
Classical liberal theory explains how social order is necessary to individual
rights. Without the state acting on behalf of the community as a whole,
individuals will have no rights in the face of other predatory individuals.
The human community and its government thus have a standing in
political discourse comparable to the standing of the individual. There is a
constant tension in liberal societies between the rights of the individual and
the public interest; between private liberty and public liberty.42 Public
liberty is the right of the community, usually the democratic community, to
restrain the individual in the interest of the greater good of the community.
And so the biological community, the ecosystem, may have rights which
are superior to any rights claims of constituent organisms, including
humans.
39. See, Native Vegetation Act, 1991, South Australia; Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protec-
tion Act (Alliance for the Wild Rockies); Biodiversity Protection Act (Portland Audobon Society).
40. See J. MCNEELY, ECONOMICS AND BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1988).
41. See Stone, supra note 24.
42. The framers of the United States Constitution struggled to achieve a balance between public
and private liberty-between the liberty of the individual to pursue his life and the liberty of the
community to regulate in the public interest. See generally, G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969).
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The difficulties with this concept of ecosystem rights are several.
Ecosystems are evolving and migrating phenomena. Presumably the.
impacts of "natural" climate change will not violate ecosystem rights,
while those caused by human activity will. But can we know the difference,
and how will we deal with ecosystem changes caused by nonhuman
constituents of the ecosystem? Environmentalists have long beseeched us
to recognize our inextricable dependence upon the ecosystem while
condemning the ecological impacts we have wrought. We are part of it yet
somehow external to it. In a system which accommodates ecosystem rights,
will those rights always trump rights claims of humans? Will humans be
sacrificed in the name of ecosystem rights?
The answer to the last question will surely be no, at least in any
imaginable rights system, since humans will represent ecosystems and
humans will be the final arbiters.4" Again we face the persistent dilemma
that ecosystems, like non-human organisms, cannot speak for themselves.
We cannot know if they want or what they want. But we can know that
some ecosystems will be sacrificed to others, with and without human
influence, with enormous impacts for their constituencies. It might be
urged that humans are not the final arbiters, and that is surely true in
cosmic terms, but rights are not about the cosmos. Rights are about
freedom of choice. The source of all life on earth will someday be
extinguished, but not by the choice of some solar intellect. Rights do not
have any significance in the cosmos, but they can and do have enormous
significance to humans. Like organism and species rights claims, ecosys-
tem rights will serve the interests of some humans and disserve the interests
of others.
4. Nature has a right to exist.
In some versions, the theory of nature rights varies little from the
theory of ecosystem rights. Nature may be understood as the global
ecosystem on which the survival of every ecosystem, and ultimately every
individual organism, is dependent. Indeed this and the preceding catego-
ries of biocentric rights may be nothing more than a hierarchical ranking of
potential rights holders from the individual organism, to the species, to
distinct ecosystems, to the global ecosystem. The hierarchy could be
further elaborated to begin with the gene, and to include other taxonomic
groupings of individual organisms and varying levels of ecosystems.
Cosmic thinkers might even wish to extend the ecosystem claims beyond
43. The point here is that humans will have the final say about what rights exist and when they
have been violated. Nature, of course, is the final arbiter, but that truth does not alter the essentially
human aspect of rights claims. The laws of nature may govern human destiny in a global ecology, but
positive human laws will govern human societies.
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the earth to the galaxy or the universe.
But for the purposes of this discussion, nature is not simply a category
of ecosystem taxonomy. The idea of nature has meaning which transcends
mere taxonomy. It is an idea which has inspired a rich literary and artistic
tradition, and often religious writing." The idea that nature has a right to
exist is probably rooted in pantheism. Nature is understood to be sacred,
and although humanity is generally viewed as part of nature, it is a part
which must play by nature's rules. But it was not sufficient to explain man's
relationship with nature in purely religious terms. The inhabitants of the
magnificent North American continent were said to have entered into a
"covenant with nature." '45 Although the idea had clearly religious origins,
the secular concept of covenant as contract permitted both defenders and
exploiters of nature to speak in terms of rights and responsibilities. It fit
well with social contract theory. Together the two theories permitted
individualists to explain their relationship with the two most powerful
influences in their lives - nature and the state. "The covenant we have
made with nature ... is as much an obligation to use well our natural
environment as to protect it - and, in any case, not to destroy it wantonly
or in a wasteful manner.""6
What are the rights and responsibilities which arise from this
covenant? At different times in human history it has been argued that
humans have either the responsibility or the right to transform nature so
that it is useful for human purposes. Christian theology emphasized the
duty of man to conquer nature, while primitive societies often focused on
man's responsibilities to protect nature. Although today's advocates of
nature rights take the latter view - that nature has rights and humans
have responsibilities - their celebration of the pantheism of primitive and
some non-Western cultures is misplaced.
Environmentalists are enamored of non-Western political theory as
an alternative to what they consider to be the inevitably destructive
influences of human rights oriented political theory. Probably the most
popular model, at least in North America, is the American Indian, a people
said to have lived in perfect harmony with the land and the environment.
The survivors of the aboriginal population are at once flattered with credit
for having understood for centuries the concept of ecology, while being
insulted as a collection of philosophically homogenous societies. Neither,
of course, is true.
44. See MARTIN SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH 139-40 (1988) (arguing that this
tradition, including its religious versions, served to expiate the national guilt for having destroyed the
natural wonders of the continent).
45. Id. at 139.
46. Id. at 141.
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The native populations of North America were culturally and
geographically diverse. They, like most peoples, adapted to their circum-
stances. As generally low technology societies, they were dependent upon
what nature could provide. For some, like the fishing peoples of the
Northwest, nature usually provided abundantly. For others, like the
mountain and plains peoples, nature enticed them to follow her migrant
food supplies. Still others, like the peoples of the arid Southwest, developed
the technology of irrigation to provide what nature did not. These peoples
respected nature for what it provided and challenged nature for what it did
not provide. Their various attitudes toward nature reflected first and
foremost their circumstances in relation to the basic material needs of
human existence.
Aboriginal society does not, however, provide a useful model for
modern society in its effort to come to terms with the limits of the earth's
ecology. Our salvation does not lie in mass conversion to one or another
Native religion, or in conversion to Eastern mysticism. Perhaps over the
course of several hundred years we will become a different people, but for
the present our relationship with nature will reflect both who we are and the
circumstances of our existence. Some among us will worship nature as a
God, and others will believe that we have a moral duty to respect nature,
but for the most part we will remain a people who value nature among a
multitude of amenities in our lives. Thoreau47 and Marsh48 can influence
our values, but they will not persuade us to abandon our modern lives to
nature. Human values, informed by science and pursued with technology,
not the rights of nature, will be our redemption if we are to survive.
The concept of the rights of nature is further complicated by the
problem of defining nature. Bill McKibben has written that nature is dead,
or at least the idea of nature is dead.49 But the idea of nature, about which
McKibben writes, is a romantic one which never really existed except in the
human mind. McKibben laments the passing of the idea that humans are
mere pawns in nature's chess game. He laments that science and technol-
ogy have permitted humans to alter nature. But humans, like earth's other
organisms, have always influenced nature. Indeed, humans are part of
nature. The point of early, modern environmental writing was precisely
that. Humans are inextricably part of nature. We influence it and it
influences us. Nature is a "closing circle," 50 a "silent spring. ' 51 What if we
conclude, however, that nature has rights? What will we do with the
47. H.D. THOREAU, WALDEN (1864).
48. MARSH, MAN AND NATURE (1871).
49. B. McKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE (1991).
50. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE (1971).
51. R. CARSON, THE SILENT SPRING (1962).
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millions who live where birds once sang in the spring? How far must we
reopen the circle to return nature to her rightful condition? What is
nature's rightful condition?
B. Anthropocentric Rights Theories:
1. Individual persons have environmental rights.
The idea that individuals have environmental rights has been pro-
posed at various times and written into both domestic and international law
in various forms. 2 The focus has generally been on the impact of
environmental degradation on individual health, but it is certainly possible
to think in terms of rights claims by individuals for the protection of
individual creatures and organisms, species, ecosystems, or nature. Indi-
viduals may be interested in any or all of these levels of the natural system
for various reasons. These reasons may be as important to some individuals
as health reasons are to others. Some individuals may be prepared to
sacrifice their health or other interests for the protection and promotion of
their interests in nature. There is surely no reason to conclude that certain
interests can be the subject of rights while others cannot.
Shifting from rights claims on behalf of natural objects to rights
claims on behalf of individuals' interests in natural objects overcomes one
of the basic difficulties with the former type of claims. Rather than seeking
to achieve the impossible objective of nonhuman organism or system
participation in human institutions, individual rights claims can be
asserted by the individuals themselves. This avoids the inevitable difficulty
of human interests being asserted as those of nature. From the point of view
of advocates of nature rights, it suffers from the acceptance of the foregoing
as inevitable. But it is inevitable, and therefore a deception to claim
decisions are being made in respect for the rights of nature.
These individual rights claims in nature can take various forms. An
extreme version might be that every individual has a right to the existence
of every organism, species or ecosystem. Presumably the significance of
such a claim would be that any and all individuals could demand that
nature damaging actions be stopped or that compensatory damages be
paid. Of course such a universal claim of right could not be sustained even
in the most primitive society. Alternatively, the individual claim of right
might be for the survival of particular organisms, species or ecosystems.
52. See, e.g., 1991 Fla. Laws 282 ("Every Florida resident has a right to breathe clean air, drink
pure water, and eat nutritious food."); Mont. Code Anno. 75-3-304 (1992) (recognition of state
responsibility to protect "the constitutional right to a healthy environment"); Ohio Rev. Code Anno.
3722.12 ("The right to a safe, healthy, clean, and decent living environment."); 35 Penn. Stat.
6020.102 (1991) ("The citizens of this Commonwealth have a right to clean water and a healthy
environment.").
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For example, native Alaskans have what are known as subsistence rights
which might be understood to be rights in the survival of those species upon
which they have traditionally subsisted. 53 Other native Americans might
claim a right to the survival of those species which are essential to their
religious ceremonies. 5" Such claims of individual right may be viable in
theory as applied to particular species or perhaps to particular ecosystems,
but certainly not to individual organisms. However, such claims of right
have the characteristic of being affirmative in the sense that someone,
presumably the government, has a duty to assure that the species or
ecosystem in question survives. Like other claims of affirmative right, the
government may well be unable to meet its obligations. 55
2. Societal claims of right in nature.
Some of the foregoing arguments might be made on behalf of the
notion that society, or particular communities, have rights in nature. The
Native Alaskan subsistence right might be understood as a community
right, as may the claims of Native American religious rights. Cattle raising
communities, fishing communities, logging communities and other re-
source dependent communities might claim a right to the survival of the
ecosystems which make their lifestyles possible, even where the ecosystems
are not "natural" as with timber monocultures and seeded grazing lands.
Social claims of right might be on behalf of much broader communities or
on behalf of an entire state or nation. For example the United States might
assert a right for the survival of the bald eagle as the national emblem, or
Guatemala might claim a right to the protection of the Quetzal bird which
adorns its national flag.
At some level such claims of right will merge with notions of the public
53. See, e.g., Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1992) (authorizing taking of
marine mammals "for subsistence purposes by Alaskan natives"). The term subsistence in this and
other legislation refers not to actual subsistence but to a particular lifestyle which developed under
conditions of true subsistence.
54. See, e.g., Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668 etseq. (1992). The Act authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to permit the taking, possession, and transportation of bald or golden eagles, or
any part thereof, for the religious purposes of Indian tribes upon a determination that the taking,
possession, and transportation is compatible with the preservation of the bald or golden eagle.
Furthermore, amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1992) have been proposed which would recognize a right in Native Americans to use the parts of
otherwise protected animals. 1992 H.R. 9757. Senator Innouye is expected to introduce a similar
amendment in 1993.
55. Negative rights claims are the traditional formulation under the United States Constitution.
They are claims to be free from specific governmental intrusions upon the person. Affirmative rights
claims are advocated as a guarantee of a minimum level of welfare or other benefit. See, e.g.
Michelman, On ProtectingthePoor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
Negative rights are satisfied by governmental restraint, affirmative rights require that the government
acquire and transfer wealth in some form. The former can be guaranteed, the latter cannot.
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interest and will suffer from the same shortcomings as does public interest
theory. Essential to both the idea of social rights and the idea of the public
interest is that the community or social group has interests distinct from
the interests of its constituents. The community must be understood as a
distinct entity which is more than the sum of its parts. Although
communities certainly have distinguishing characteristics which influence
their individual members, we have no satisfactory mechanism for deter-
mining community interests. Short of a rule of unanimity, community
decisions are unavoidably those of some, but not all, members of the
community. There is no more reason to conclude that those who assert
community rights will know the community's interest than that those who
assert nature's rights will know nature's interests. Indeed there is every
reason to assume that what purport to be rights claims on behalf of nature
or the community will reflect the interests of the individual claimants.
V. NON RIGHTS BASED THEORIES FOR PROTECTING NATURE
The obvious alternative to a rights based approach to the protection of
nature is the political process. Nature advocates would prefer the rights
based approach because the point of rights is that they function as trumps
in the political system. Rights elevate the particular protected interest
above the give and take of politics. They guarantee that the protected
interest will be satisfied.56 In the ordinary political process the nature
interest must compete with many other interests for the attentions of the
legislators, regulators and judges. What nature advocates and every other
interest group seek is an argument which will raise their claims above the
fray of political battle and cost-benefit analysis. Nature advocates have
several avenues of argument, in addition to claims of right, which might
still elevate their claim above others in this political competition. Even if
nature does not have rights and people do not have rights in nature, it can
still be argued that nature gets special consideration.
1. Humans have a moral obligation to nature.
Environmental ethics is a relatively new branch of philosophy devoted
to the questions of whether humans have moral obligations to nature and
what any such obligations are. There is a professional journal devoted
exclusively to the inquiry57 and numerous books and articles have explored
56. Of course under the Supreme .Court's levels of scrutiny approach to individual rights
interpretation, rights claims can themselves be trumped by public interest claims. Although much ink
has been spent on explaining and implementing this approach to constitutional rights enforcement, it
has served to undercut the classical theory of individual rights. Nevertheless, rights claims remain an
influential aspect of public decision making in this country.
57. ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1979-present).
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these questions.58 Claims of moral obligations to nature are generally
rooted in either or both of two basic approaches. Not coincidentally, these
approaches parallel the biocentric and anthropocentric claims of right
discussed above.
There is much about nature that is awe-inspiring. From serene beauty
to unimaginable destructive force, nature affects human lives in ways that
have inspired and affected most human pursuits. Many of these pursuits
have been devoted to controlling and altering nature, but usually with a
respect for the central and essential role of natural forces in human lives.
This respect is rooted in both wonder and understanding. Humans wonder
at the magnificence and power of nature. They understand that nature
encompasses life forms which are different from yet somehow related to
human life. Wonder argues for protecting that which is incomprehensible,
while understanding argues for protecting that which is like us.
It is not surprising that moral arguments for the protection of nature
are usually associated with the scarcity of that which is protected. Many
will argue that we have a moral obligation to preserve Old Faithful geyser
in Yellowstone National Park. Few will argue that we have a moral
obligation to preserve every hotspring on earth. Indeed it may be argued
that we have a moral obligation to develop many of the earth's hotsprings
for their energy potential as an alternative to the use of polluting carbon
fuels. Thus, moral arguments about nature can favor both use and
preservation. It is a dichotomy reflected in the early history of modern
environmentalism.
Modern attitudes about nature are rooted in two traditional strains of
environmental thought: conservationism and preservationism. Conserva-
tionism, what Bryan Norton calls aggregationism, 59 was founded at the
turn of the century by Gifford Pinchot and others who argued for the wise
use of natural resources. Pinchot was a forester who believed that the
resources of the public lands could be made to provide "the greatest good
for the greatest number over the longest time." 0 Although the prescription
of maximizing for two, let along three, variables simultaneously is
demonstrably impossible, Pinchot's basic idea was understood to call for
the sustained utilization of the resources of the public lands. Pinchot
believed that this prescription should apply to all natural resources, even
those which had been set aside as national parks.
As applied in the forests, where Pinchot exercised great influence as
first head of the Forest Service, the conservation approach called for the
58. See, e.g., K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1981); H. ROLSTON,
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: DUTIES TO AND VALUES IN THE NATURAL WORLD (1988).
59. See BRYAN NORTON, TOWARD UNITY AMONG ENVIRONMENTALISTS 17-38 (1991).
60. See G. PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION 48 (1910).
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harvesting of native stands of timber and the replanting of those species of
trees which would produce the most fiber for human consumption. This
approach did not take account of other forest species except to the extent
that they were important to timber production or to the provision of other
human benefits. The monocultures which characterize much of today's
public and private forests are, in significant part, the product of the Pinchot
approach to resource management. Trees were to be viewed as a crop little
different from corn or wheat except that they required a longer period for
maturation. In many respects this was a moral argument rooted in
utilitarian philosophy.
When extended to wildlife this utilitarian approach to resource
management called for the management of those species which served the
interests of humans. For the most part this meant management for game
species. Hunters constituted the major political constituency with an
interest in wildlife, and they exercised that influence both through the
federal land management agencies and the state wildlife management
departments. Most states linked their wildlife management budgets to
hunting license fees which further encouraged wildlife managers to be
responsive to the interests of hunters. Nongame species suffered in this
system of management, often with ultimately detrimental impacts on
game habitat.
The preservationist school of thought was founded on the writings of
John Muir.6 Muir brought a non-utilitarian, moral argument to his case
for protection of the natural environment. His was in some ways a
pantheistic approach which sought to persuade resource managers that
they have a moral duty to protect nature and its many species, both plant
and animal. Landscapes and natural settings were to be preserved for their
intrinsic values, rather than for the benefits they would provide to humans.
Human lives were enhanced by nature and diminished by the destruction
of nature. Muir understood that human life required the alteration and
destruction of nature, but he sought to protect those aspects of nature
which were particularly inspiring to the human spirit.
Of course not everyone with an interest in resource management was
committed to one view or the other. It was possible to expand the scope of
environmental protection required under the conservation approach by
expanding the list of human uses to include nonmarket values like
birdwatching, hiking, camping, and the simple aesthetic enjoyment of
natural settings. Increased understanding of the ecological dependence of
marketed resources on the natural system as a whole also expanded the
scope of environmental protection required by the conservation rationale.
61. J. MUIR, GENTLE WILDERNESS: THE SIERRA NEVADA (1967).
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Furthermore, not every person with an interest in the politics of resource
management has a clear philosophical position guiding their political
actions.
But those who do take a moral position about either the preservation of
nature or the wise use of nature seldom gain the superior political position
they seek. It has become, or perhaps it always has been, the practice in
American politics for interest groups to elevate their arguments by appeal
to morality. If one can claim a moral reason for what they seek to achieve
through the political process, their interests should be preferred over mere
economic or other nonmoral interests. But in a political world where
virtually every claim is presented as moral, there can be no moral high
ground. Political savvy and power, not claims of moral superiority, will
govern the use and nonuse of nature.
2. Humans have a religious obligation to protect nature.
The moral arguments for the protection -of nature discussed above
might be alternatively viewed as religious obligations. There is a pantheis-
tic character which marks much environmental argument. Robert Nelson
has pointed out, in Reaching for Heaven on Earth: The Theological
Meaning of Economics,62 the essentially religious nature of some environ-
mentalism, and particularly of deep ecology. It is evidenced both in the
fervor and substance of much environmental advocacy. For many environ-
mentalists the measure of one's fellow is in commitment to the faith, not in
the achievement of particular environmental goals.63 For example, those
who would resort to market mechanisms in pursuit of environmental
objectives are held in disrepute by those who are committed to the principle
that capitalism is the source of environmental degradation. Divisions
which have occurred in the environmental community are not unlike the
schisms which have impacted religions throughout human history.6 4
1 Although religious claims have the advantage of being justified with
reference to an authoritative source, as opposed to moral claims which
must face the challenge of 'moral relativism, they can be problematic for
several reasons. In the American system of government there is a
62. R. NELSON, REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE THEOLOGICAL MEANING OF
ECONOMICS (1991).
63. The resistance of most environmental groups to market approaches to environmental
objectives evidences that the pursuit of environmental quality is often secondary to adherence to
orthodox environmentalism. See James L. Huffman, Protecting the Environment from Environ-
mentalism, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLeY (1992).
64. Environmental groups are not immune from the power struggles which affect all human
institutions. Environmentalists are all familiar with David Brower's transition from Sierra Club insider
to Sierra Club outsider. See, PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRON-
MENTAL MOVEMENT 100-101 (1993).
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constitutional separation of church and state. Opponents of environmental
regulations might argue that government actions to protect nature are
unconstitutional because they support religion. Although this seems a
farfetched argument in light of existing establishment clause doctrine,65
the line between secular and religious motivations for government action is
not easily drawn. Native Americans are lobbying for greater protection of
sacred sites which often reflect the pantheism of native religions. Environ-
mentalists have generally supported these claims for obvious reasons.
Whether federal or state protection of natural areas in the name of native
religious interests constitutes unconstitutional establishment or constitu-
tionally mandated guarantee of free exercise is a dilemma inherent in the
religion clauses of the constitution. 6 It is surely unlikely that nature
protecting actions which purport to be motivated by secular objectives,
even if they are religious in the ways underscored by Nelson, will face
constitutional problems. However, facially religious claims on behalf of
nature may well face such constitutional challenges.
Religious claims on behalf of nature may overcome the problem of
determining what is natural since religious scripture or other authoritative
sources will provide the answer. However, western religions have generally
worked contrary to the interests of nature as conceived by most modern
environmentalists. Christian theology generally mandates human domi-
nance of nature. Nature is to be used to promote the good of humanity.6 7
The point is that religions, including Native American religions, have
generally reflected the needs and circumstances of particular societies.
Religious dogma often outlives those needs and circumstances for a time,
but the survival of any religion is dependent upon its compatibility with the
society it serves. Modern society may well benefit from the worship of
selected natural objects or places, but it cannot survive the worship of a
65. There is no caselaw suggesting that environmentalism constitutes a religion which must be
allowed free exercise while not benefiting from government support. Perhaps the closest the Supreme
Court has come to this issue is in Native American religious claims, to which the Court has not been
very sympathetic. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
66. In the 20th Century the Supreme Court has been chary of pronouncing on what constitutes
religion for 1st Amendment purposes. The Court has distinguished religious from philosophical beliefs,
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), but has seldom been willing to pronounce beliefs
nonreligious. The Smith case demonstrated that the court could avoid the definition of religion by
accepting a claim as religious while upholding a regulation as not intrusive of the free exercise right.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. In any case asserting that environmentalism is a religion, there is little doubt
that the current Court, if unwilling to classify environmentalism as philosophy rather than religion,
would come to the same result as they did in Smith.
67. "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."
GENESIS 1:28. Although this language has been interpreted by some to be an invitation to
environmental destruction, Vice President Al Gore argues that such an interpretation is incorrect. AL
GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 218 (1992).
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particular conception of nature. Old Faithful and perhaps the Grand
Canyon of the Colorado can be protected from human alteration in
perpetuity, but not every hotspring and river can be so protected.
Ultimately, religious claims are indistinguishable from moral claims
on behalf of nature. Both'seek a special place in political debates, but both
occupy only that place which the political system permits. Moral and
religious claims dn behalf of nature will have more influence in homoge-
nous than in heterogeneous societies. They are simply valuations of nature
which, when widely shared, are more likely to prevail in the political
process.
3. Nature should be preserved because it is natural.
The argument that nature should be protected because it is natural
proceeds from the assumption that natural is better. It is an assumption
promoted by nature advocates and capitalized upon by many producers of
goods and services. The argument parallels the rights claim on behalf of
nature. It is not obvious, however, that natural is better. Whether we
adhere to an absolutist or a relativist concept of better, few will seriously
assert that natural is always better. Nature has various means of causing
unimaginable pain and misery to humans and other creatures. Diseases,
storms, earthquakes, floods, droughts and a multitude of other natural
phenomena have posed challenges to humanity's efforts to make life better.
Precautions, in the form of manipulations of nature, are almost universally
accepted as a good thing.
Sometimes natural is better, sometimes it is not. Knowing the
difference is sometimes obvious, sometimes not. Like the definition of what
is nature, the determination of when natural is better is unavoidably a
function of human values. Some people take great pleasure in witnessing
the crashing forces of a coastal storm, others see such storms as a threat to
their homes and livelihood. Some people glory in the natural fireworks of a
late summer's lightning storm, others see the lightning as a threat to timber
lands or wildlife habitat. Floods on the Mississippi have devastated human
communities while creating fertile farmland in the Mississippi Delta. The
claim that natural is always better is simply indefensible in any political
system which permits humans to be valued. Notwithstanding the self-
sacrificing claims of a few deep ecologists, there is no political system in
which humans will ever rank lower than first on the list of things valued. It
is always a matter of which human values, not whether human values, are
to count.
4. Human society will be better off if nature is protected.
The claim that human society will be better off if nature is protected
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acknowledges that human values will inevitably control human actions,
but argues for a presumption in favor of preserving that which is natural.
The point is not that nature is superior because it is natural, but rather that
humans will always, or almost always, be better off in the long run if nature
is preserved. Like the other claims on behalf of nature, this argument
suffers from the problem of defining what is natural. Its bigger failing,
however, is that it mandates highly risk averse public policies.
The presumption that humans will be better off if nature is protected
preempts the cost/benefit analysis inherent to policy making by conclud-
ing, without empirical evidence, that the costs of nature destruction are
always greater than the benefits. Environmentalists are not unusual in
seeking such exemption for their programs. Advocates of new highways
argue that traffic safety is a special case because of the infinite value of
human life. Proponents of public health programs similarly rely on human
life as their claim for special treatment. These and other preemptive strikes
on the public fisc underscore the absurdity of such claims when viewed in
relation to the often conflicting claim by orthodox environmentalists that
nature must be protected at any cost.
Presumptions of significant value are not inappropriate to human
decision making, whether individual or social. Often the marginal costs of
information collection and analysis will exceed the marginal gains in terms
of individual of social welfare. In such cases, where they can be anticipated,
it is appropriate to adhere to a presumption favoring a decision we are
confident we will reach with or without more detailed information. Our
experience can often tell us which decision we are likely to take, and we can
save needless expense by adopting a presumption favoring that decision.
This is quite a different matter from adopting a presumption which reflects
the choice which a particular interest would have us make. A presumption
in favor of nature protection requires justification in relation to the
aggregated values of society.
The experience of every modern society suggests the invalidity of such
a presumption. Human welfare has benefitted dramatically from the
manipulation and alteration of nature. Humans in most parts of the globe
live better lives, by their own standards, than did their parents and
grandparents. They have better health, longer life expectancy, more
comfortable dwellings, and more interesting and diverse lives than their
predecessors could have imagined. Much of this advance has resulted from
technology which has altered the natural environment. On the other hand,
alterations of the natural environment have resulted in terrible injury and
loss to humans. The point is that neither nature alteration nor nature
protection are presumptively good. More often than not we should want to
carefully examine the consequences of human impacts on nature. We
should accept neither the presumption of technological optimism nor the
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presumption of nature protection. The argument that humans will be
better off if nature is protected, which today most often takes the form of an
argument for biodiversity, must be recognized for the risk averse, special
interest, political claim that it is.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Endangered Species Act is the most ambitious law ever adopted
for the purpose of preserving animal and plant species. Because of its past
and anticipated future impacts, the Act is certain to be subjected to
ongoing challenges which will require persuasive justification by support-
ers. Those who seek to make the Act more powerful, or to redirect its focus
to ecosystem protection, will face even greater demands for justification.
Experience suggests that these justifications will take the form of either
claims of right or claims of special status for other reasons. Rights claims
are the most attractive to nature advocates because in western political
theory rights function as trumps over ordinary political decisions. Claims
of special status create a presumption in favor of nature protection which
are hoped to have a similar effect on the political process.
Biocentric rights claims fail because they must be asserted by humans
and enforced by humans. Anthropocentric rights claims avoid these
fundamental problems, but they suffer from being affirmative rights claims
which no government can guarantee in a finite world. All rights claims on
behalf of or to nature are unavoidably claims for special treatment by those
individuals and groups who value the protection of nature. Rather than
pursuing their cause in the rough and tumble of politics they seek to trump
political decisions through claims of right. The same can be said of claims
of special status based on morality, religion, naturalness or human benefit.
Such claims would have policy makers presume that nature protecting
outcomes are to be preferred to alternative outcomes. If such presumptions
are accepted, they serve the interests of those valuing nature protection at
the expense of those with competing values.
The essential point is that once actions affecting nature are committed
to the political process, they are unavoidably political decisions. In the
American political system these decisions will reflect the existing distribu-
tion of political influence. Decisions may be made in the name of biocentric
rights, but only if humans who occupy positions of power prefer the
protection of nature to the alternatives. Advocacy of nature rights can
influence the values which these decision makers hold, but it can never be
more than that - an effort to influence the values of those in power. The
nature interest must contend in the competition which constitutes the
political allocation of scarce resources. It may be an important interest,
even one which can claim the stature of a moral interest, but it must
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nevertheless compete with other interests which make similar claims of
right and morality. There is no escaping our humanity.
